THE NASTY ILLINOIS ELECTION CAMPAIGN OF 1862
By the Rev. William F. Moore of The Lovejoy Society
For the Illinois Historical Society Conference
December 6, 2002 at Springfield, Illinois
The Hon. Rev. Owen Lovejoy, Congregational minister from Princeton, Illinois
Antislavery Congressman since 1856, political ally and personal friend of Lincoln, faced an extremely bitter campaign in 1862. He was hated for his powerful rhetoric, his influence on Lincoln and his successes in Congress. He was influential in most of the great issues and was the leader in Congress on the slavery issue.
The remarkable achievements of the Second Session of the 37th Congress (Dec.2, 1861- July 17, 1862) included the formation of lasting domestic institutions, the establishment of an economic plan to sustain the war against the rebellious states, and the passage of national legislation limiting slavery. Specifically it passed the Homestead Bill, the Morrill Act forming land grant colleges, established a Department/Bureau of Agriculture, and provided ways and means to establish the Pacific Railroad. On the economic front it created a national currency, a national banking system and raised the enormous funds to sustain the war effort. On the slavery issue it prohibited the military from returning fugitive slaves, ended slavery in the District of Columbia, delivered on the organizing principle of the Republican Party-- prohibiting slavery in all the territories, and legally authorized the military to confiscate the property (including slaves) from all those in rebellion against the country. These were monumental achievements that shaped the nature of our democracy.
Lovejoys experience, skill and commitment made him a powerful member of that Congress. Lincolns secretaries, John G. Nicolay and John Hay, reported in their history, . . . among those whose zeal gave them (antislavery measures) especial prominence in these debates, the names of Charles Sumner in the Senate and of Thaddeus Stevens and Owen Lovejoy in the House need only to be mentioned to show what high qualities of zeal and talent pursued the peculiar institution with unrelenting warfare.
Equally irritating to the Democrats was Lovejoys cordial relationship with Abraham Lincoln. Though a Radical Republican committed to the goal of eventually ending slavery, Lovejoy refused to rant against the President for his slowness in the war effort. Instead he eloquently defended the difficulties facing the Lincoln Administration and exuded his confidence in the President. If the President does not believe all I do, I believe all he does. If he does not drive as fast as I would, he is on the same road, and its a question of time. In the same speech he warned of the perilous conditions in the country, Safe pilotage is quite as needful now as propulsive power, for there is a semi-secession foe crouching in the jungles of a sham Democracy, ready to spring upon the Union forces at the very first opportunity that promises any success. Proslavery Democrats thirsted for Lovejoys defeat in the fall of 1862. He was a target for pro-slavery wrath not only because of his indignant language against slavery, but also because of his effective antislavery influence in Congress and with the Lincoln Administration. One newspaper, The Union Advocate in Geneseo, Illinois, claimed the defeat of Lovejoys reelection would be worth an additional ten thousand troops to the rebel cause.
Lovejoy had won by 6,000 votes in 1856, by 9,000 votes in 1858, and by 10,000 votes in 1860. In 1862, with his proven effectiveness having aroused deep emotions, with the opportunities of a redrawn district, with the troubles facing the Lincoln Administration, and with the sagging war effort, the opposition against him was highly energized.Direct competition in the election with a proslavery Peace Democrat or a proslavery War Democrat was unlikely to defeat Lovejoy; so the opposition craftily ran a Conservative Republican, with war credentials, who blamed the antislavery agitators for the war. The opposition forcefully claimed support of the Lincoln Administration to win votes, but found it difficult to support Lincolns Emancipation Proclamation. They presented the Lincoln Administration as the true Democratic Party working to restore the Union through negotiation that would allow slavery to continue. They seduced Col. Thomas J. Henderson, an able, respected, former Republican legislator from
I. National Context
In the summer of 1862 the Lincoln administration
was at low ebb. The Union Troops were suffering large numbers
of fatalities from wounds and illness with little to show for it. The Border States were rebuffing his gradual, compensated emancipation
plan. Inflation was causing hardships. The federal treasury was empty, and the
bankers were upset about a national paper currency to solve that crisis. Business suffered from closed markets and interrupted
Both political parties were fractured. Lincoln was straddling them all. Some Northern Democrats sought peace through negotiation, seeking to restore the Union with slavery the way it was. Other Northern Democrats vigorously supported the war effort to force the traitorous rebels back into the Union. Of these Democrats, some wanted the South returned with slavery intact, while others wanted assurances that slavery was moving toward extinction.
Some Republicans encouraged the war effort vociferously. They wanted to end slavery in America once and for all time. These so called Radical Republicans embarrassed the President publicly with reports from the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War. Conservative Republicans did not want to discuss slavery or to aggravate the Border States into leaving the Union. They approved of Union Generals moving slowly.
Lovejoy was a loyal supporter of Lincoln. He understood the need not to alienate the Border States. He assisted Lincoln in May 1862 in passing the White House Plan to compensate slaveholders for their slaves even though compensation went against the grain. On the other hand, he pushed the Congress and the President to pass a bill prohibiting slavery in all the territories. Border States rejected Lincolns final efforts for a gradual, compensated emancipation plan, and the Second Confiscation Act was passed in July of 1862.
The President began to consider an Emancipation Proclamation. Most cabinet members and advisors thought it would hurt the Republican cause in the mid-term congressional elections. Lincoln was just as aware that the Proclamation might be politically premature. However a leading War Democrat, Indianas Robert Owen, had written a letter to the President advocating an end to slavery in order to save the Union. His letter signaled a significant shift in public opinion in critical places, which Lincoln was waiting for. The letter was printed in local papers, including the Bureau County Republican.
Popular opinion in the North was beginning to favor a broadening of the wars purpose to ending slavery as well as saving the Union. Lovejoy contributed to this shift in opinion at the Cooper Institute in June 1862: I here declare to you my deep and solemn conviction that the Emancipation of the Slave is essential to the safety and perpetuity of the Republic. This growing shift in public opinion was reflected in the legislation that Congress had passed prohibiting slavery in the District of Columbia and the Territories.
Conservative Republicans and Peace Democrats were encouraged by one aspect of Lincolns Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation: for Lincoln offered the Border States and the Confederacy a last chance for a negotiated peace--southern rebellious states had 100 days to return to the Union under guarantees to compensate masters for their slaves and to send freed slaves to the Caribbean or Africa.
On September 17, 1862, General George McClellan won a decisive victory at Antietam. On September 22 the President presented his conditional emancipation plan. The timing of Lincolns announcement played a critical role in Lovejoys election campaign. It challenged the body politic to come to grips with the issue of ending slavery.
Lincoln heard increasing reports and rumors of clandestine and treasonous resistance. Sensing the mood of the nation, he suspended the writ of habeas corpus on September 24, 1862. This led to the incarceration of some proslavery political leaders as well as proslavery plotters who planned physical resistance in the North.This abrogation of civil rights became an issue used against Lovejoy in the 1862 campaign.
II. The Illinois Context
After Fort Sumter fell to confederate forces, the President on April 15, 1861, called for 75,000 volunteers to strengthen the Union Army. He requested Senator Stephen Douglas to go home to quell the growing dissension in Southern Illinois. Governor Richard Yates called a special session of the legislature. At the joint session on April 25, Douglas presented his famous dictum, There are only two parties now--patriots and traitors. . . . It is a duty we owe to ourselves, and our children, and our God, to protect this government, and that flag, from every assailant, be he who he may. This was Douglass last great act of service to Illinois and the Union he loved. He convinced Democrat John Logan of the Union cause. Logan then became a Republican and directed many Southern Illinoisans away from proslavery activity.
notable Democrats began to support the restoration of the Union by force. In
Yates, former Whig Congressman and friend of
Republicans led by Orville Browning, one of
As indicated, proslavery Peace Democrats dominated the state constitutional convention, which began on January 7. 1862. The delegates tried to usurp the power of the governor in his war efforts. They failed. Then they passed resolutions to give equal votes to each county, thus allowing the sparsely populated counties of conservative Southern Illinois to control northern counties interests. Next, they eagerly limited the powers of the banks in financially difficult times. Finally the Convention passed a resolution to codify into law the 1853 resolution that prohibited free Negroes from moving into the state.
As soon as the Convention ended most Republicans, including Owen Lovejoy, organized to defeat the proposed constitution. The Chicago Tribune headline was Down with the Secession Constitution. On June 17, the Constitution was easily defeated by 16,000 votes. However, the tag-a-long referendum to codify into law the 1853 resolution prohibiting free Negroes coming into Illinois passed by a majority of about 70,000 out of the 290,000 votes cast. This large majority confirmed the existence of strong racial prejudice in the state that Democratic candidates could tap into.
and Republicans who strongly favored the war effort to save the Union decided
to form a Union Republican Party. They
invited representatives from both parties to attend a convention on
complication of the
III. Tactics of the Opposition
The opposition leaders planned to get votes against Lovejoy in any way they could from any group they could. They went after the Democratic vote by claiming that Lincoln was a true Democrat. The Bureau County Democrat wrote in March, It is true that Lincoln is a Republican, but he is only a Republican in name--his principles as developed in his official capacity, are strictly in conformity with the principles entertained and advocated by the Democratic party.
In the middle of May the schemers of the opposition to Lovejoy went to the Princeton Republican caucus. They walked out claiming that the platform had consisted only of denunciation and proscription of Democrats.  The Bureau County Patriot painted the Republicans as hard-nosed. We would give every rebel private time and opportunity for repentance and return to his loyalty, but if they persist in their treason, we would proceed against every scoundrel. . . . But we have no sympathy with that rash class of men, who . . . endorse indiscreet, untimely and suicidal measures . . . and all hopes of an early and honorable close of the war frustrated. As early as May this was one of the primary tactics of Lovejoys opposition--to separate him from the popular, cautious, moderate Lincoln Administration.
One of the major schemers was Charles J. Peckham, the editor of the Bureau County Patriot. He was accused of converting the Bureau County Democrat into the Patriot not only to separate Lovejoy from Lincoln but also to receive $400 of public printing from a disaffected Republican County Treasurer. The most notorious schemer was Mr. J. V. Thompson who spoke at a Princeton War Meeting on August 4, 1862. The Bureau County Republican reported that,
(He) tried his hand in the old stale trick of exciting Negro prejudice, a thing that once had some potency, but which all right minded people now feel to be sadly out of date. His buffoonery excited some laughter but no approval. Mr. Lovejoy was called upon to answer this attempted attack on him and his speech, but he expressed just enough contempt by quietly remarking, that he was in earnestthat the cause of our country was a serious subject, and that he had great faith in the common sense of the American people. This was so applauded by the audience that Thompson seemed to shrivel up, and wonder where he was.
Thompson had felt similar embarrassment when he introduced Senator Stephen Douglas in Princeton in 1854. Then Lovejoy upset Douglas so much, that Douglas had to relinquish his promise to Lincoln, and continue to talk about the Kansas-Nebraska Act. In March of 1863 the Copperheads had a meeting at which J. V. Thompson and M. Kendall recommended opposition to the administration by force of arms unless the President recall this emancipation and Nigger regiment policy. Even though this is after the election of 1862, these treasonous attitudes indicate the depth of hostility of the leaders of the opposition to Lovejoys reelection.
schemers went after the Republican vote before they even had a candidate.
They brought the anti-abolitionist Republican Senator Orville Browning to
schemers waited until Lovejoy was officially nominated in
The pipes were so admirably laid, beforehand, by the schemers, that when the self styled Union Convention, met on Friday last (Oct. 3, 1862), the delegates had nothing to do but cast their votes for Col. Thomas J. Henderson. . . . Is there no limit to their madness? Of course the delegates from this town were not permitted a sight behind the curtains, for they were honest men, and the slightest intimation of what was going on, or a hint of the object of the convention, would so change the complexion of the vote that it was not deemed safe to let them into the wire-puller secrets, lest their cake should become dough, and the fat thrown into the fire. . . . And Col. Hendersona man whom we respect and admire, as a manhas suffered himself to be made a cats-paw ofhas injured himself beyond redemption. . . . Nobody with common sense will say that he can hold a candle to Mr. Lovejoyeverybody knows that Mr. Lovejoys election is as sure as the sun rises.
opponents strategy was to win the well-meaning conservative Whig Republicans
who identified with
opposition attempted to bring together the conservative Lincoln Republicans,
disaffected Republicans, citizens tired of the war, and War Democrats committed
to the saving the Union, with or without slavery. They did this under the
conniving influence of the proslavery Peace Democrats who loathed the successful
antislavery leaders, especially Lovejoy. Their scheme relied on the assumption that Lincoln,
the Great Delayer, was planning to restore
the President upset their political plans, when he announced the Preliminary
Emancipation Act. Now, how could they claim that
On the other hand, the early emancipation proclamation and the proclamation suspending habeas corpus turned into effective projectiles to throw at Lovejoy. Ironically, Lovejoys previous assets were turned against him as liabilities. He became vulnerable on two fronts. First, for many years Lovejoy, under great pressure of being labeled an abolitionist, had insisted he was not a Garrisonian abolitionist who advocated immediate emancipation of all slaves. To prove it he repeatedly claimed he was for leaving slavery alone where it already existed. Now his integrity was in question. Now he supported ending slavery where it already existed. Democrats throughout the North howled, I told you so [;] this is an Abolition war and nothing else.
another insistent theme, since his brother Elijah Lovejoys death, was
the encroachment of the rights of the people of the North by the southern
slaveholding power of the Democratic Party. Now, the
opposition used a variety of other unusual tactics. In order to counter balance Lovejoys military
labels were blurred. Republicans such as Orville Browning were against
Lovejoy and Democrats such as Eben Ingersoll,
who frequently appeared with him at speaking engagements, were for
Lovejoy. The Republican Governor and
Senator were critical of
he was opposed to a proclamation of emancipationhad said it would be
unwise and impolitic, and does not say in that letter or elsewhere,
that he approves the Proclamation of Emancipation issued recently by President
Lincoln. The Times (Chicago) and State Register (
ability to smoke out this duplicity was crucial to the effectiveness of his
IV. Tactics of Lovejoy
huge War Meetings held in
August 27, Lovejoy met with
Lovejoys new district included only Bureau and Putnam counties from his old district and five new counties to the west and south of Bureau. This made it necessary for him to build a new campaign organization and get acquainted with many new constituents. All the counties except Peoria, however, had gone for Lincoln in 1860. The counties of the new district gave Lincoln a majority of 6,266 votes in 1860. Drawn up by Republicans in the legislature, this new Fifth Congressional District should have been favorable toward Lovejoy.
returned to Illinois in early September. He began his canvass at Galesburg,
where he had once been an examiner for Knox College and was well received
by the strong antislavery community. The delegates at the Fifth District Congressional
Convention at Galesburg unanimously nominated him for reelection on Sept.17.
Eight resolutions passed on conduct of the war, opposition to compromise
with the South, upholding
A few days later in the presence of the troops of the 77th Illinois Regiment he again placed suppression of the rebellion at the head of the tasks facing all loyal men. He ignored a question about the n-----r, as the Transcript reported, and moved on to supporting Lincoln. Old Abe is captain and I am prepared to pull the ropes just as he orders.
A week later Lincoln issued the Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation. Two days later he attended the Republican Union State Nominating Convention at Springfield. When the platform that was presented had not one line endorsing the Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, Lovejoy asked for the floor. This is how Joseph G. Cannon, a later Speaker of the U. S. House of Representatives, recalled the scene years later. 
I shall never forget the scene which then occurred. Owen Lovejoy addressed the chair. There were cries of Sit down from all over the hall. Lovejoy exclaimed, God helping me, I will not sit down. I will be heardand he was heard. For five minutes he spoke as never a man spoke before, fighting for the Republican policy and for the Illinois convention to sustain the proclamation. At the close he offered a resolution endorsing the proclamation. A vote was taken and the resolution was carried. Lovejoy then arose in his place and said, I can now say with Simeon of old, now, Lord, let thy servant depart in peace, for mine eyes have beheld Thy salvation.
The resolution read in part, We cordially endorse the proclamation of freedom and confiscation of the President.
Edward Magdol in his thorough biography of Lovejoy in 1967 reports that Lovejoy embarked on a tour of almost daily speech-making. His supporters in the field were most efficient including many young men some of them not old enough to vote. Veteran antislavery leaders like William Allen who for many years had been his colleague and the four editors of the major Republican papers in Geneseo, Princeton, and Peoria made a big difference in the campaign. In early October the Peoria Daily Transcript asserted, it is useless to charge Lovejoy with being radicalThe President of the United States has issued a proclamation as radical as anything Mr. Lovejoy has uttered. The Transcript aptly scolded Henderson, The opposition candidate said he was for Lincoln but opposed the preliminary emancipation proclamation. Since the Peace Democrats who supported Henderson not only opposed the Proclamation, but also adamantly opposed the Lincoln Administration, the Transcript asked, How could Henderson consort with these deadly enemies of Lincoln?
John W. Forney, a Pennsylvania journalist close to Lincoln, complained that Lincoln didnt support any Republican in the 1862 election, not even his friend Owen Lovejoy. David Donald suggests that, he (Lincoln) held aloof from the congressional contests because there was not much he could do to influence their outcome. He goes on to quote Lincoln saying in September 1862, I believe that I have not so much confidence of the people as I had some time since. It may be that Lincoln, however, did speak to Browning and Kellogg confidentially, as he had done on behalf of Lovejoy in previous campaigns, since there is no record of their publicly supporting the Henderson campaign. Lincoln was delighted with Lovejoys victory and would have done whatever he could, if he thought it would have been helpful.
V. Some Interpretations of the Election
won over Henderson by 641 votes. If there had not been a Democratic candidate
on the ballot in Henry County who received 589 votes, and if in a few other
counties Democrats hadnt received 32 votes, Lovejoy would have won by
only 20 votes out of the 23,324 votes cast. The longstanding antislavery communities
of Galesburg, Geneseo, Princeton and Granville gave
him his victory. Lovejoy carried his
home county (Bureau) by only 192 votes. In 1860 he had carried it by 1,938 votes. It
is admitted on all hands that the fight in this county against me has been
unparalleled in unscrupulous ferocity. In addition to this, I have spent but
little time in the county and in my absence the enemy sowed tares. Larger cities tended to be Democratic and Lovejoy
lost Peoria County by over a 1,017 votes.
invited 60 of his associates to a victory dinner at the American House in
(1) He described the nature of the campaign and his feelings during it.
The campaign was without a parallel in the bitterness of its animosity, the acrimony of its spirit, and the unscrupulousness of the means. . . . There have been times, I confess, when standing alone, and receiving the murderous fire of regular and irregular and guerila and bushwhacking from life long enemies and former friends that I felt resentment and thirsted for revenge. But I can say, with unaffected sincerity, these feelings have passed away with the hour. I am too old a man and too good a Christian and patriot, to harbor feelings of malice and revenge. Anger testeth in the bosom of fools. I have lived long enough to know that these sentiments and evil passions hurt their subjects more than their objects.
(2) He was clear about his opposition.
Among the curiously made up crowd from
the Republican ranks were leaders whose love of office was stronger than their
attachment to principle. . . . One of the wickest
things the rebels do is to raise the Union flag, and under its protection,
march close to the loyal soldiers and then pour murderous fire into their
ranks. So the Democrats and the disaffected
Republicans arrogated to themselves the name of
(3) He saw the election as a struggle between freedom and slavery, liberty and despotism.
The intense and invigorated opposition to me is because I am supposed to embody and represent an intensified opposition to slavery . . . I look upon the recent context as one of those steps in the progress of freedom towards a final triumph. Friends of Universal Freedom in the 5th Congressional District, let me thank God and take courage. Let us move onward yielding principle to no one, and say to all, Come and go with me and we will do good, for God hath spoken good concerning the Zion of Freedom.
The Geneseo Republic believed in October 1862 that Col. Henderson has injured himself beyond redemption, and politically the resurrection hour can not fetch him home. However, he was politically resurrected. In late November after the election he wrote a letter, which the Union Advocate published in full. He claimed that I have been most outrageously wronged, abused and slandered, and that others will repent of the injury done me, when repentance is too late. He was referring to articles in the newspapers such as Geneseo Republic. Officers of high rank and lower rank . . .write home that Col. Henderson has already taken the opportunity to show the slave-holders that he is not an enemy of slavery. Whether he was wronged or not is not known. However, he served in the Union Army until the end of the war. And in 1874 he was elected to Congress from Princeton and served from 1875 to 1895.
Why was the campaign so close? Did the Republican newspapers that predicted an easy Lovejoy victory simply underestimate the power of racial prejudice in their own districts? Did the Trumbull and Yates criticisms of the President cut into Lovejoys base? Did Secretary of War Stantons resettlement of Negro refugees on the farms of Illinois hurt Lovejoy politically? Did the Browning and Kellogg conservative Republicans decide for a non-agitating Republican? Did weariness of the war and placing blame for it upon the abolitionists reduce his support? Did Col. Hendersons reputation as a Republican with deep roots overcome the implication that he was a tool in the hands of the pro-slavery Democrats? Did anybody predict that the shrewd, scheming wire-pullers of the pro-slavery Democrats would be able to win the votes of both War Democrats and Peace Democrats in six out of seven counties with a Republican candidate? Did Lovejoys support for the suspension of habeas corpus alienate voters who felt their political allies were being harassed for being accused of giving physical assistance to rebel forces? Did the apparent loss of Lovejoys integrity by his appearing to have changed his position on emancipation and on the encroachment of basic rights hurt him? Probably all of the above eroded his support.
Another factor was the absence of the soldiers vote.
Large numbers of Democrats fought valiantly especially from the southern section
of the state under John Logan. In the northern part of the state larger numbers
soldiers were Republicans. In Lovejoys
The question of the campaign was which coalition would win? Would the coalition of Conservative Republicans and Peace Democrats who wanted to protect slavery, be able to defeat the coalition of Antislavery Republicans and War Democrats who wanted to preserve the Federal Union and eventually eliminate slavery? The proslavery Democrats needed to blame the war on the agitating abolitionists and Radical Republicans. As long as the proslavery Democrats could confuse the public by asserting they were for saving the Union, they had a chance of reaching into the ranks of the conservative Republicans and also some War Democrats. The Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation became the instrument to expose their proslavery leanings.
The Lincoln administration had to effectively keep a respectful distance from the agitating radicals and yet tap into the emerging northern consensus that slavery was wrong and should be on the course of ultimate extinction. This was the position that Lincoln and Lovejoy had carefully and eloquently claimed from the formation of the Republican Party in Illinois in 1856. During 1862, northern public support grew for the freeing of the Negro slaves who were giving logistical support to the rebel army and for their enlistment into the Union Army. Enough northerners, even Democrats had come to comprehend the Souths irrational self-affliction at rejecting gradual, compensated emancipation. When other international, and military events made it propitious, President Lincoln decided to test the political waters. His tentative partial emancipation plan was based on the military powers of the Constitution. In order to save the Union militarily, he argued it would become necessary to free some of the slaves.
One of the test cases of this policy would be in the Fifth Congressional District of Illinois. Would the belief that slavery was wrong and should eventually be ended have enough staying power in a district where that message was clearly known and upheld by its popular Congressman? Lovejoy would effectively use the Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation to expose the insidious proslavery democratic scheme of enticing Conservative Republicans to vote against the administration of the Union. Lovejoys approach exposed that the intention of the Democrats was for saving slavery more than saving the Union. After this election Lincoln and the Republican leaders developed policy that did emergethat you couldnt save the Union without ending slavery.
The Fifth District, the state of Illinois, and the Nation went solidly Republican by large margins in 1864 due to successful military efforts and the efforts of many political leaders led by Lincoln in exposing an attempted alliance between conservative Republicans and proslavery Democrats, which was experimented with in the Fifth District in 1862.
Lovejoys congenial personality, hard work, accomplishments in Congress, oratorical and organizational ability led him to victory. Yet, his support of the Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation during the campaign was also an important factor in his reelection. Magdol and others claim that Lovejoy downplayed the proclamation, quoting a Quincy paper in a more conservative district than his, Lovejoy supports the proclamation, but has never been officious in urging it. Lovejoy did claim in Peoria that he had quit agitating the emancipation question long ago, believing the wagon had got to the top of the hill; and would go down fast enough without any aid.
Despite that caveat, Lovejoy did adamantly stand by the president and the emancipation issue. The Union Advocate wrote, Mr. LOVEJOY honestly avows himself a radical. As such he goes for a radical support of the Administration, and a radical prosecution of the war. He most heartily approves the two late Proclamations of the President. The Democratic paper, the Springfield Register, reporting on the Republican Union Convention in Springfield wrote, Lovejoy and Co. are for suppression of the rebellion, and ergo all who do not agree with their mode of suppression and their schemes for profit are against suppression. It went on to say, The convention only indorses one of these efforts (of suppression) and that one is the issuing of a proclamation announcing to the rebels what the government will do three months hence. . . . then Negro insurrection, murder, arson and rapine will be invoked. . . . They indorse him only so far as he accedes to their revolutionary demands.
In the Democratic stronghold of Peoria, Lovejoy amended Lincolns famous reply to Horace Greeley, If we could best save the Union by saving slavery, he said amen; if we could save it best by partially saving slavery, he said amen to that; if to save it was thought necessary to destroy slavery, twenty amens to that. Lovejoys message was clear: Support the Lincoln administrations prosecution of the war to preserve the Union and the emancipation of the slaves as a means to that end.
After the election, the Peoria Daily Transcript Nov.20, 1862, reported that, During his late canvass, Owen Lovejoy compared the Emancipation Proclamation to Ithuriels spear. In John Miltons poem Paradise Lost, Ithuriel was a loyal angel when Lucifer let his revolt of the heavenly hosts. When Ithuriels spear touched the toad whispering in Eves ear, Lucifer himself was exposed for who he was.
The Transcript continued. So Lovejoy said,
just touch the secesh (pro-slavery)
democracy with this proclamation of the President and up pops the Devil!
We think Lovejoys illustration holds good so far as the proslaveryism
Lovejoys successful 1862 campaign effort was just one of many other supportive efforts for the Lincoln administration that earned Lovejoy the accolade from Lincoln, Throughout my heavy and perplexing responsibilities here, to the day of his death, it would scarcely wrong any other to say, he was my most generous friend.
 Bogue, Allan G., The Congressmans Civil War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 148.
 Nicolay, John G. and Hay, John, Abraham
Lincoln: A History Vol. IV (
 Lovejoy, Owen, Cooper Union Address
 Cole, Arthur
Charles, The Era of the Civil War 1848-1870. Vol. III of the Centennial
Charles A., History of the Republican Party in
 Cole, p. 267.
 Ibid, p. 297
 Ibid, p. 277.
 Courtlandt, Canby, Ed. Lincoln and the Civil War (New York: Dell Publishers, 1958), p. 175.
 The entire paragraph is based on Cole, pp. 259-272.
 Cole, p. 296.
Peter Bryant to brother Cullen Bryant,
 Magdol, p. 363.
William W., The South vs. the South (
 Donald, p. 382.
 Lusk, David W., Eighty Years of
 Magdol, p. 364.
On the emancipation question, Mr. Lovejoy defined himself. He said he had quit agitating the question long ago, and in the last session Congress did his best to keep old brother Wickcliffe, of Kentucky, from spouting on it, but he did not succeed. Believing, he said, that the wagon had got to the top of the hill; it would go down fast enough without any further aid.
His individual opposition to slavery was in the present crisis subordinate to have love for the Union. He indorsed (sic) President Lincolns letter to Horace Greeley. If we could best save the Union by saving slavery, he said amen; if we could save it best by partially saving slavery, he said amen to that: if to save it it was thought necessary to destroy slavery, twenty amens to that. The grand object of the war was the preservation of the Union and the constitution, and Emancipation, if adopted, would be only a means to that end.
The speaker reviewed the position in which Slavery stood with regard to the rebellion, his views being precisely the as those urged by all loyal men not influenced by a love for the peculiar institution. He showed the aid given the rebels by their slaves, and the great advantage of depriving them of their services. The remainder of the speech was confined to an explanation of the provisions of the confiscation bill, and a defense of the justice of that measure.
 Hon. Joseph
G. Cannon Address at the State convention in
 Magdol, p. 369.
 Ibid. p. 370.
 Donald, p.381
 Allen, Howard W.,
 Geneseo Union Advocate,
 Cole, p. 279.
 Ibid, p. 259
 Not in
 Neeley, Mark E. Jr., The Abraham Lincoln Encyclopedia (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1982), p. 100.
 Magdol, p. 368.
 Geneseo Union Advocate,
 A. Lincoln to John Howard Bryant, May 30, 1864, in Bureau County Republican, June 10, 1864.